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Hitting with the force of a 100-year storm,
the first two years of the onslaught of the
financial crisis caused a $ -5.2 billion swing
from profitability to loss for the top 22
performing Las Vegas Strip properties. These
properties went from generating a combined
Pre-tax Net Income of $ +1.5 billion in fiscal
year ending June 2007 1 to a pre-tax net loss
of -$3.7 billion in 2009. 2 The most damage
was done during the initial two-year period
but lingering forces continued to cause harm:
in 2010 the combined loss had shrunk but
was still in negative territory at $ -1.8 billion.
The recently released 2011 report indicates
the top performing properties are still
running at a pre-tax net loss that is
stubbornly high, $ -1.6 billion. 3 All was not in
negative territory, however. In calendar year

(“CY”) 2011 total visitor counts have virtually
returned to 2007 levels, 39.1 million visitors
versus 39.2 million visitors in CY 2007. Other
signs of recovery trickle in but are sporadic
and volatile. (See Figure 1)
What does all this mean? What does it
imply for the future of Las Vegas? This paper
looks at where Las Vegas has been, where it is
now and how it got there as a means to help
the brave predict the future.
Before delving into the numbers to better
understand the dynamics of the financial
crisis’s impact on the Las Vegas Strip
properties, the inherent economic structure
of casinos and some of the situational forces
that impacted the top Las Vegas Strip
properties during this five year period need
to be understood.
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Casinos are typically both capital and labor
intensive. These two forces push up the
intersection of the revenue and expense
curves, the breakeven point, because they
raise the starting point of fixed costs, steepen
and accelerate the shape of semi-fixed and
variable costs that must be added to
immovable fixed costs. When revenue is
strong and up the revenue curve beyond the
breakeven point this embedded financial
structure creates operating leverage, i.e.,
percentage increases in profits can increase
faster than percentage increases in revenue.
Because revenues continued to grow
unabated in Las Vegas for such a long period
of time producing good if not great operating
margins, high cash flows and ROIs relative to
many other industries the casino industry
was regarded as “bullet proof,” revenue was
infinite, and growth an entitlement. But,
under these same conditions, when revenue
sags the worm turns, revenue slides down the
revenue curve and the same shape of the
expense curve that worked so well on the
upside works against the owner with
operating margins, profits, and ROIs all
suffering and, in fact, increasing the further
revenue drops (reverse operating leverage).
Aggravating the “status quo” many of the
big Las Vegas properties today were built
when banks were lining up to lend money for
gaming projects even if they did not need it.
This, when combined with unbounded and
ultimately unrealistic developer’s optimism,
resulted in a plethora of upscale properties
that today are so big, so expensive (size and
quality level), and too inflexible design-wise
and position-wise to morph sufficiently to
escape a loss when revenue fell.
Additionally, in an exquisite example of bad
timing, several big companies that operated
multiple large existing properties were taken
private taking on hoards more debt to finance
the buyout on the bet that revenues would at
the worst continue at pace but would
actuality continue to show even higher
growth. Unfortunately, for those involved,
this further reduced the margin for error on
the downside, for some severely.

Thus, when the financial crisis and
aftershocks caused the downturn the
breakeven point was at its highest and the
expense curve at its steepest and most
accelerated. The result? The revenue drop off
was more impactful than normal. Companies
rushed to save themselves (and executives
their jobs) by pushing debt repayment back
and paying for the privilege. This only made
things worse.
The data analysis in this paper will use
2007 as a benchmark against which to
measure current performance because this is
when Pre-tax Net Income for the top Strip
properties peaked at $ +1.5 billion. In order
to better identify, quantify, and focus on the
forces at work that led to the most recent
2011 $ -1.6 billion loss this article will focus
on the $ -3.1 billion variance between the two
periods. Negative signs (“-“) will denote
unfavorable variances and positive signs (“+”)
will denote favorable variances. It is insightful
to begin with an understanding of the
structure of the variances.
The first structural dynamic that needs to
be understood is the apparent difficulty
owners and management had controlling the
unfavorable variances because they
amounted to $ -4.1 billion and 130 percent of
the net unfavorable variance. The best they
could muster in response was a $ +1.0 billion
of offsetting positive variance.
The second important dynamic is that
revenue accounted for $ -1.7 billion or 55
percent of the unfavorable variance with
expenses accounting for the remaining 45
percent or $ -1.4 billion.
The third structural dynamic is that $ -1.5
billion or 48 percent of the unfavorable total
Pre-tax Net Income variance occurred above
the EBITDA profit line the result of variances
in operating revenue and operating expenses
with the remaining $ -1.6 billion or 52
percent occurring below generated by
depreciation, amortization, and interest
which are balance sheet items related to the
cost of the project and subsequent funding.
Perhaps the most important structural
dynamic is that only a small number of the 30
revenue and expense categories that
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comprise the Pre-tax Net Income Statement
drove the results. Two categories accounted
for -69 percent of the net variance, the top
four accounted for 108 percent, and two
others bring the total to six and cumulatively
accounting for $ -3.8 billion or 122 percent of
the total negative variance. The remaining 24
line categories summed to a net positive
variance of $ +0.8 billion or 22 percent of the
remaining variance bringing the net to $ - 3.1
billion.
These dynamics tell us not only what was
and is happening but what needs to be done
in the future to prevent a recurrence. Let us
look further into the variance following the
sequence of the financial statement to
understand more.

Revenue
The front of the financial crisis storm
caused an initial revenue drop of -13 percent
in one year from an aggregate Total Revenue
of $14.6 billion at its peak in 2008 to $12.7
billion in 2009. Total Revenue hit bottom in
2010 at $12.1 billion. It climbed back to $12.8
billion in 2011 but disappointedly to still only
88 percent of the 2008 peak.
How much of this decrease was the direct
and indirect result of a world economic
epidemic, the financial crisis, and the socalled U.S. Great Recession that ensued? The
chart below shows the year-over-year change
in selected U.S. sales categories as a reference
point. Growth in all sectors hit a wall and
decreased but fell to 0 percent to -6.4 percent
growth except for the auto industry which fell
off a cliff experiencing a -23.9 percent drop.
By 2010 all of the categories, including the
auto industry, were at zero or experiencing
slow growth. By 2011 the sales pace for five
out of the six categories were above 2008
levels, three had climbed back to their fiveyear peak dollar sales volume and two set a
new record for the five-year period. The auto
industry had climbed back to within 85
percent of its 2007 peak dollar sales volume.
(see Figure 2)
While admittedly a small sample, it appears
that the top performing Las Vegas Strip
casinos fell harder than other consumer
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industries and has been slower to recover
except sharing a kinship with the auto
industry. This is not surprising, per se, given
that even in the value chain of leisure,
entertainment, and recreation pursuits casino
gaming would probably fall in the sector
comprising activities that are first to be cut
and among the slowest to rebound. For
automobiles a recession may mean deferring
a car purchase or purchasing a small and
lower priced car. For casino gaming, for most
it means stopping or severely cutting back
and, problematically for Las Vegas, playing
closer to home now that casino gaming is
relatively widespread across the United
States.
Was the fall in revenue due to a decrease in
overall visitor count, budget (spend per
visitor), or both? See Figure 3.
Initially not only the number of visitors
decreased but also spend per visitor. The
decrease in visitor count stopped in 2009 but
spend per visitor did not bottom until 2010.
By 2011, even though year-over-year visitor
count and spend per visitor were both
positive the increase were to levels that were
still below 2007 levels, i.e., 89 percent and 91
percent, respectively. This is better than the
automobile industry’s performance but less
than the other sales sectors that returned or
were above their peak levels by 2011. While
in percentage terms this may not look like a
lot in hard dollars the top Las Vegas Strip
casinos had $ -1.4 billion less in revenue or an
average of $ -63 million per property. When
fixed costs are high this can be toxic as will be
shown later in this article.

Capacity
Capacity and Goldilocks have a lot in
common: both want “Not Too Much. Not Too
Little. But, Just the Right Amount.” Because
too much can drive up capital and operating
costs and too little may prevent the casino
from being able to serve the demand that
exists. In aggregate net capacity did not
change radically among key revenue
activities. There was one less property in this
category, 22 properties in 2011 versus 23 in
2007. But, despite the decrease of one
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property, the number of tables games
increased by 52 units or +2 percent to a total
of 2,255 tables. Slots, by comparison, reduced
in count by approximately 3,000 units or -9
percent to 37,319 units. Daily room capacity
increased only a net of +574 rooms to 70,774
rooms or 1 percent. The average property
had 3,217 rooms in 2011 versus 3,052 in
2007. It would appear that insufficient
capacity was not an issue but that too much
capacity in terms of the number of units
and/or the cost of those units may be a
lingering issue. Each surplus unit of capacity
cost capital dollars to build and operating
dollars to fund debt repayment and fixed and
semi-fixed operating expenses.

Utilization
Whether there is too much or too little
capacity can often be determined by
utilization levels. Win per unit per day can be
used as a rough proxy used for physical and
financial utilization of gaming capacity. The
win per unit per day for slot machines was
$180 in 2011, a +9 percent increase over the
$165 reported in 2007 and directly
correlated to the -9 percent reduction in
capacity indicating the increase was capacity
not demand related. In monopolistic and
oligopolistic venues, slot win per unit can be
much higher in the over $200 to as high as
$600 range. But, over the short term, once a
casino is built and the slot machines are
purchased it is hard to make any radical afterconstruction or short term changes; the ploy
is generally to make what you have work
better. For table games win per unit per day
was $3,473 in 2011 versus $2,913 in 2007, a
+19 percent increase, much greater than the
+2 percent increase in capacity. However,
virtually all of this increase was due to
Baccarat, a high average bet game. A total of
141 new full size Baccarat games were added
from 2011 versus 2007 but, in effect replaced
other games that were removed.
On the non-gaming side, occupied rooms
only decreased -4 percent translating into a
91 percent occupancy in 2011 versus 96
percent in 2007, a remarkably high
occupancy rate at either level for this number

of rooms. But average daily room rate
suffered as one might expect in value seeking
times: it dropped -15 percent to $131 from
$154, indicating that owners/operators had
to decrease price to generate the room
demand they could. Structurally, this is
damaging because at these high utilization
levels the marginal profit at both occupancy
levels is at its peak due to operating leverage.
Lowering rates to keep occupancy high may
have been a necessity but the attendant
decrease in occupied rooms combined with
the lower average daily rate has a greater
than proportionate impact on profit. The
tension between policies to keep heads-inbeds that would spend on gaming and other
non-gaming activities versus maintaining
hotel rate driven brand equity and
profitability has been tense these last few
years. Some of the top 5-star, 4-starplus, and 4star properties found that by lowering their
average rate they were getting budget
conscious customers in their room that did
not spend their typical customer profile
amounts on the gaming floor or restaurants,
bars, and entertainment venues or worse. To
their dismay, some found they were
becoming dormitories to value conscious
visitors because those in the rooms were
going to less expensive properties for their
gaming, food, beverage, and entertainment
activities.
In a gaming destination like Las Vegas
revenue per occupied room can be telling. In
aggregate for the group, gaming revenue per
occupied room was $200 in 2011 vs. $232 in
2007, a -14 percent decrease. Interestingly,
food and beverage revenue per occupied
room was $120 in 2011 versus $115 in 2007,
a +4 percent increase. The $ +5 increase came
$ +1 from food and $ +4 from beverage, the
latter perhaps not surprising given the
increased stress resulting from the financial
crisis but also due to the expansion of day
clubs and nightclubs at the casinos during
this period whose drink prices are
incrementally high.
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Investment
A balance sheet item, the Cost of Fixed
Assets (i.e., the cost of the physical facility and
certain other assets before deductions for
Depreciation and Amortization) increased
almost $10 billion or +32 percent to $40.3
billion. This is a huge increase and as a
foreshadowing of the next level of analysis,
will be shown to have a huge impact on Pretax Net Income. For now, however, let it
suffice to say that in aggregate the cost of
each property increased +32 percent yet total
revenue decreased by -13 percent. Put
another way, the additional investment and
cost/unit did not, could not, or has not yet
served to offset the decreases in revenue
and/or find new demand/revenue to replace
it.

Profit
Turning to profit – the acid test for
capitalism – Pre-tax Net Income actually
peaked in 2007 at $1.5 billion. In 2008 Pretax Net Income fell to $0.8B. But, in 2009
when revenue fell off the -13 percent cliff Pretax Net Income fell to $ -3.7 billion. 4 Why?
Because, as already alluded to, this decrease
in revenue kicked reversed operating
leverage to its ugly twin and in many
instances took properties past the breakeven
point where losses increase faster than the
drop in revenue. Thankfully, in 2010 the rate
of decline slowed as companies reacted the
best they could but still reported a Pre-tax
loss of $ -1.8 billion. In 2011 the top
properties were still “in their sick bed” with
an aggregate loss of $ -1.6 billion. For private
and publicly owned companies the sign is
supposed to be positive and sufficiently
positive to repay debt and provide an
adequate return to investors. Any result
below these thresholds progress from
disappointing to bad as it approaches zero
then awful when it turns negative.
From Profit to Loss
To help determine what forces caused Las
Vegas Strip properties to slide from operating
at a profit to a loss, let us undertake a more
rigorous comparison of the variance between
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the most recent year reported Pre-tax Net
Income of $ -1.6 billion in 2011 to the peak
Pre-tax Net Income of $ +1.5 billion in 2007.
The variances will be further segregated into
revenues and expenses first in aggregate,
then by department, and finally by the type of
expense.
Of the $ -3.1 billion unfavorable variance in
Pre-tax Net Income $ -1.7 billion or 55
percent was attributable to a decrease in
Total Revenue and $ -1.4 billion or 45 percent
was from an increase in expenses. See Figure
4.
The negative EBITDA variance was
generated by the aforementioned decrease in
Total Revenue of $ -1.7 billion but was offset
somewhat at this level on the financial
statement by the collective
owner’s/manager’s efforts to decrease
expenses by $ +264M. Even so, expenses
could not be reduced fast enough: expenses
decreased +2 percent but revenue fell -12
percent. This caused the EBITDA margin to
slide from 25 percent of total revenue in 2007
to 17 percent in 2011. Not only had revenue
decreased a significant amount, less profit
was being brought to the bottom line for each
revenue dollar generated.
Figure 5 delves further into the variance by
looking at each operating department and the
bulk General and Administrative category
then rank ordering the profit variance first by
the largest unfavorable variance and then by
the largest offsetting favorable variances.
Now it can be seen that the Gaming and
Hotel departments were the culprits that
drove the unfavorable EBITDA variance
representing a combined -106 percent of the
total decrease. Four of the five operating
departments incurred revenue losses with
the two largest, Gaming and Hotel, both
unable to prevent an -18 percent period-overperiod unfavorable revenue variance. Only
the Beverage Department was able to
generate a +9 percent increase in revenue.
Of the four departments showing an
unfavorable revenue variance, three were
able to reduce expenses, Gaming, Other, and
Food. Gaming could not do so quickly or deep
enough to offset the revenue loss hence,
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together with a slight revenue shift toward
the lower margin table games versus slots,
the decrease in departmental profit margin
dropped to 33 percent in 2011 from 41
percent in 2007. By contrast the Other and
Food Departments were able to decrease
expenses faster than the decrease in revenue
thus showing a favorable period-over-period
increase and higher departmental margins:
48 percent versus 36 percent for Other and
17 percent versus 10 percent for Food. The
Beverage Department showed an unfavorable
increase in expenses but at a rate less than
the increase in Beverage Revenue thus
allowing it to show a positive Departmental
Profit variance and a 1 percentage point gain
in margin.
An increase of 12 percent in General and
Administrative Expenses that was 23 percent
of Total Revenue in 2011 versus 19 percent in
2007 added to the unfavorable EBITDA
variance.
Looking at the same EBITDA data rank
ordered by expense type provides additional
insight to what has been taking place (see
Figure 6)
In reviewing the above expenses it should
be recalled again that overall Total Revenue
decreased -12 percent over this period with
Gaming and Hotel revenues decreasing -18
percent each. The only decrease in expense
that tracked the rate of decrease in revenue
were Gaming Taxes (which are taxes on
revenue and therefore outside the control of
management and directly variable so no
credit can be given here) and Rent which may
be due to performance clauses tying rent
expense to revenue and/or profits as much as
coincidence.
Labor’s Role
Digging in a bit further, it should be
remembered that Labor is the largest single
expense category for the top performing Las
Vegas Strip casinos comprising 38 percent of
total EBTDA expenses in 2011 vs. 40 percent
in 2007. Payroll and Related Expense
decreased $ +298 million or +4 percent but as
a ratio to Total Revenue increased +2
percentage points because Revenue dropped

faster than the cost of labor. Benefits
represented 57 percent of the decrease with
payroll the remaining 43 percent. The
number of employees was down +11 percent
or +283 employees per property to an
average of 3,859 employees per property.
Payroll per Employee increased -7.5 percent
during this period with the decrease in the
number of employees suggesting an increase
in average wage and/or a shift in the mix to
higher paid employees. Benefits decreased on
a per employee basis but not enough to
prevent the combined Payroll and Related
cost per employee increase of -4.5 percent.
Variations by department in Payroll and
Related Expense (shown in the green box)
and selected metrics that measure such
results are shown in Figure 7.
Assuming that staffing was right-sized to
deliver target service levels and labor
productivity was efficient in a financial
context in 2007, headcount should have
decreased at least at the same pace as the
decrease in physical demand, e.g., the
decrease in the number of casino players and
playing time of those players, the number of
occupied rooms, food covers, drinks served,
and entertainment seats sold. All of the
statistics needed to determine if this occurred
are not provided by Nevada gaming
regulators. But, employee headcount
decreased +11 percent which is probably in
line with visitor count reduction but Salaries
and Wages increased either due to increased
rates and/or a shift in the mix to higher paid
employee categories and could not be offset
by a decrease in Payroll Taxes and Benefits.
In the final analysis, the total Payroll and
Related Expense only decreased -4 percent
not enough to prevent adversely impacting
profit when revenue fell +12 percent.
Other Expenses
Marketing Expense showed a Period over
Period unfavorable increase of $ -161 million
or -8 percent causing the ratio to total
revenue to increase 3 percentage points. Care
must be taken in interpreting this variance,
however, because different companies
categorize expenses differently when it
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comes to marketing. In this analysis Music &
Entertainment expense is included under
Marketing because it is an activity used to
generate traffic to a casino more so than to
act as a profit center. If Music and
Entertainment is removed, the variance
becomes a favorable $ +55 million.
Complimentaries, free services given to
players and non-gaming customers as
incentive to patronize the property increased
$ -25 million. But, Gaming comps decreased $
+28 million. Hotel comps increased $ -52
million presumably to keep “heads-in-beds”
which seemed to work for the Hotel
Department based upon the aforementioned
91 percent 2011 twelve month occupancy.
Combined Food, Beverage, Other, and General
& Administrative comps increased a net of
only $ -1 million. Bad Debt, considered a
Marketing Expense because credit is also
used as an incentive to motivate gaming and
non-gaming patronage, also increased but
only $ -12 million. Preferred Guest Expense,
additional incentives paid to the best casino
players, decreased $ +67 million. Advertising
and Promotion decreased $ +28 million.
It is reasonable to expect, perhaps even
demand, that the Marketing Expense
increases with such a decrease in revenue in
order to fight to retain customer loyalty, steal
market share from competitor casinos in Las
Vegas and in other venues, and to attract new
players/visitors to Las Vegas when
disposable income and leisure time is
strained domestically and internationally
across virtually all demographics.
Other Expenses at the Operating level
decreased $ +208 million or +13 percent, a
good showing, but were offset by a $ - 245M
or -18 percent in the General and
Administrative Expense categories resulting
in a net unfavorable variance of $ -37 million.
It is unclear what may have caused the
General and Administrative unfavorable
variance because this is a bulk reporting line
item.
Food Cost of Sales decreased $ +29 million
or +5 percent enabling the ratio to food
revenue to stay more or less steady in the 29
percent range by falling with the same rate as
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the decrease in sales. Beverage Cost of Sales
also decreased $ +11 million or +8 percent
and, as a ratio to total beverage revenue
improved to approximately 16 percent from
approximately 19 percent with more sales.
This may have been due to volume of drinks
but during this period a number of night and
day clubs opened which are able to charge
high prices for their drinks. Other Cost of
Sales decreased $ +46 million a +19 percent
variance improving the ratio to total Other
Revenue to 10% from 12 percent on
decreased sales.
Combining the departmental variances by
expense in Figure 8 shows the departmental
source and dynamics as well as the expense
type.
By focusing on the ‘right’ of the graphic
under EBITDA it can be seen that essentially
the decrease in revenue could not be
staunched and expenses could not be
decreased fast enough to offset the decrease
in revenue. Two departments accounted for
the majority of the drop in revenue, Gaming
and Hotel revenue. Together they accounted
for 62 percent of unfavorable variance in
revenue, 38 percent and 24 percent,
respectively. The increase in departmental
profit of the other three operating
departments essentially offset the increase in
General and Administrative expenses. As
stated previously the Owner’s commitment to
size and to five and four star quality-levels
together with inflexible building design,
contracts, and other forces seemed to
conspire to make expenses apparently
difficult to reduce.
The Rest of the Picture
Figure 9 illustrates what occurred below
EBITDA and completes the picture of what
drove the remaining $ -1.6B unfavorable
variance.
The $ -0.5 billion unfavorable variance in
Depreciation and Amortization is primarily a
manifestation of a $ +10 billion in the Cost of
Fixed Assets, i.e., an increase from $30.6
billion in 2007 to $40.3 billion in 2011.
Depreciation and Amortization is a non-cash
expense that reduces tax payments and
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thereby reduces net income but does not
typically affect free cash flow. But, since it
affects earnings, however, it can also affect
debt covenant ratios and the stock prices of
publicly traded companies which can have
other implications.
The interest charge is the single greatest
source of unfavorable variance among all
categories, $ -1.1 billion representing 35
percent of the total variance in Pre-tax Net
Income. It is a huge number in the absolute:
$2.3billion in 2011. This is a result of an
increase in debt of $ +22.3 billion and an
increase in leverage, i.e., Debt to Total
Liabilities and Capital Ratio from 44 percent
in 2007 to 70 percent in 2011. Rather
devastatingly, interest took 102 percent of an
already weakened EBITDA in 2011 versus 30
percent in 2007. In aggregation, the added
capital investment of the physical plant did
not create a major increase in capacity nor
did it seem to inspire any material increases
in visitor demand or revenue. The decision to
increase leverage made things worse. Note
that had the 2011 EBITDA had the 2007
Depreciation and Amortization plus Interest
levels Pre-tax Net Income would have been $
26 million versus a $ -1.6 billion loss.
Bottom line, the Pre-tax Net Income
variance from 2011 to 2007 was $ -3.1 billion.
Revenue decreased $ -1.7 billion causing 56
percent of the variance and expenses
increased $ -1.4 billion comprising the
remaining 44 percent of the variance, albeit
the vast majority of the increase in expenses
($-1.7 billion) occurred below the EBITDA
line. The forces impacting performance were
not only those of a 100-year storm but they
were the “Perfect Storm” … physical demand
fell, spend per visitor fell, operating expenses
could not decrease fast enough, the increase
in investment along with refinancing taking
place resulted in higher debt and higher
leverage causing interest to consume an
already weakened and lower EBITDA. And,
regrettably, the increase in investment did
not increase capacity nor build properties
that inspired the Marketplace, grow existing
markets, found or unlocked new ones.

Revenue decreased -12 percent and total
expenses increased -11 percent. Not pretty.
As mentioned before four categories of the
financial statement drove 108 percent of the
variance, two revenue – Casino and Hotel –
and two expenses – Interest and Depreciation
& Amortization. Two other expenses, Other
Expense and Marketing Expense in General
Administrative combined to account for
another -13.7 percent bringing the total for
these six categories to 122 percent of the PreTax Net Loss variance. These six categories
put the top performing Las Vegas properties
in such a negative position that the remaining
24 categories could not reverse it.

Conclusion
Locals, industry insiders, vested interests,
and erstwhile friends-of-Las Vegas continue
to look for the bright side, grabbing the
smallest most incremental new factoid as a
sign that Las Vegas has hit bottom and the
inevitable return to unconstrained growth
has begun anew. Outsiders, naysayers,
skeptics, and enemies-of-Las Vegas look at
the same proverbial glass – the data stream –
and draw at best more reserved, conservative
conclusions and, at worst, a specter that the
city that has lost its mojo, has seen the End of
an Era, and doom the Gaming Mecca to a
future of mixed results and mediocrity.
In this regard, while there is a clamor for
un-emotional, unbiased, and well researched
answers to what the future holds for Las
Vegas, given the unprecedented depth and
breadth of local, regional, domestic, and
world economic difficulties that now more
than ever are interwoven and dependent
upon each other, the most honest answer
right now is “I don’t know.”
Despite this uncertainty, what is clear is
that Las Vegas has developed a critical mass,
is THE Gaming Mecca for North America, and
enjoys unique dynamics that suggest it will
not become a modern day western ghost
town anytime soon, but will remain a major
tourism center. The question then becomes
not IF Las Vegas prospects will continue to
rebound but over what period of time, at
what pace, and perhaps most importantly
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what will be the stabilized level performance
and the new growth dynamics that build from
there? To use the parlance of the day, “What
will be the New Normal?”
One thing is for sure, however: not having
learned from the past five years and
continuing to do business “as usual” are
prescriptions for mediocrity at best and
perhaps ruin at worst.
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Figure 1

Version 1.6.

Figures

AGGREGATE LAS VEGAS STRIP RESULTS
TOP PROPERTIES – GENERATING >$72M IN ANNUAL GAMING REVENUE
TOTAL
VISITORS

TOTAL
REVENUE

TOTAL
PRE-TAX NET INCOME

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

39.2M
39.1M
36.1M
36.7M
38.3M

$14.6B
$14.6B
$12.7B
$12.1B
$12.8B

$ +1.5B
$ +0.8B
$ -3.7B
$ -1.8B
$ -1.6B

CY 2011

39.1M

Source: Actual visitor counts June 2006 through November 2011 from Las Vegas Convention and Visitors
Authority. CY 2011 visitor count was estimated by University of Nevada-Las Vegas Center for Business &
Economic Research.

Figure 2

YEAR OVER YEAR CHANGE IN SALES
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
0.0%
-5.0%
-10.0%
-15.0%
-20.0%
-25.0%
-30.0%

FY 2008

FY 2009

FY 2010

FY 2011

RETAIL + FOOD SERVICE

4.5%

-3.9%

0.9%

6.5%

AUTO + OTHER
VEHICELS

-3.6%

-23.9%

3.1%

12.1%

CLOTHING

1.7%

-6.4%

0.3%

5.0%

SPORTING GOODS,
HOBBY, BOOK, MUSIC

2.8%

-4.2%

0.1%

5.2%

GENERAL MECHANDISE

4.2%

0.7%

1.2%

3.0%

FOOD SERVICE +
DRINKING PLACES

4.0%

0.8%

0.1%

4.4%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau and Macomber International, Inc.
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Figure 3
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VISITOR DRIVEN STATISTICS
ALL CLARK COUNTY CASINOS GENERATING OVER $1M IN GAMING REVENUE
YoY CHANGE
YoY CHANGE
TOTAL REVENUE
IN TOTAL
IN TOTAL
PER VISITOR and
TOTAL REVENUE
VISITORS
YoY CHANGE
2008
-0.9%
-0.2%
$557 -0.8%
2009
-11.8%
-7.6%
$531 -4.6%
2010
-5.0%
+1.5%
$497 -6.4%
2011
+6.8%
+4.3%
$509 +2.4%

Figure 4

Favorable variances are shown with a green background and/or a “+” sign and unfavorable variances
with a red background and/or a “-“ sign. The 2011 over 2007 percentage change is shown below each
variance.
PROFIT
PT NI Variance
% Change

($3,144,530,442)
-208%

REVENUE
($1,748,911,667)
-12%

EXPENSES
($1,395,618,775)
-11%

We need to look further. Let us take a look at the operating or EBITDA level which, as already
mentioned, accounted for 48 percent of the unfavorable variance.
PROFIT
EBITDA Var.
% Change

($1,484,931,759)
-40%

REVENUE
($1,748,911,667)
-12%

EXPENSES
$263,979,908
2%

[12]

Occasional Papers | Center for Gaming Research | University of Nevada Las Vegas

Figure 5
PROFIT

REVENUE

Gaming
% Change
Hotel
% Change
Gen. & Admin.
% Change
Other
% Change
Food
% Change
Beverage
% Change

($807,182,911)
-33%
($765,179,760)
-29%
($314,131,344)
-12%
$239,845,896
33%
$120,432,582
58%
$41,283,778
12%

($1,044,700,738)
-18%
($691,216,963)
-18%

EBITDA Var.
% Change

($1,484,931,759)
-40%

Margin
2011

EXPENSES

Margin
2007

33%

41%

60%

69%

23%

19%

($29,544,125)
-1%
($55,954,031)
-3%
$72,504,190
9%

$237,517,827
7%
($73,962,797)
-6%
($314,131,344)
-12%
$269,390,021
20%
$176,386,613
10%
($31,220,412)
-7%

48%

36%

17%

10%

44%

43%

($1,748,911,667)
-12%

$263,979,908
2%

17%

25%

“Other Department” may include entertainment, retail (revenue and or lease income), other
operating departments not listed and other income.
Figure 6
VARIANCE
Marketing
% Change
Other
% Change
Labor
% Change
Cost of Sales
% Change
Gaming Taxes
% Change
Rent
% Change

Figure 7

($161,218,799)
-8%
($37,372,319)
-1%
$297,712,618
7%
$86,327,881
9%
$75,802,544
17%
$2,727,983
15%

RATIO TO
TOTAL
2011
2007
17%

14%

24%

21%

32%

30%

7%

7%

3%

3%

0%

1%

LABOR VARIANCE DISAGGREGATION – FY2011 VS. FY 2007
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Source: Nevada Gaming Abstract,
Las Vegas Strip Casinos generating >$72 million in annual gaming revenue

PAYROLL & RELATED
CASINO

+2,868 employees

+13%

HOTEL

+3%

FOOD

+560 employees

+9%

BEVERAGE

GEN. & ADMIN.
NUMBER
OF
EMPLOYEES

TOTAL

WAGES
AND
BENEFITS (proxy)

SCHEDULING EFFICIENCY
AND
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY (proxy)

+10%

-18%

+2,255 employees

+1%

OTHER

-9%

+25%
+14%

+nil%

-5%

+63 employees
+2,711 employees
+1,921 employees

-2%
-12%

+9%

-1%

-16%

-nil%

+7%

-27%

-6%

+2%

-9%

-3%

+7%
+10%

-22%

-14%

+31%

-2%

+3%

+

BENEFIT PER
EMPLOYEE
Favorable + 2

=

+11%

HOTEL

- 8%

FOOD

+ 9%

BEVERAGE

+ 3%

OTHER

+ 8%

GEN. & ADMIN. +13%

EMPLOYEE
HEADCOUNT
Favorable + 11% +10,378
WAGE PER
EMPLOYEE
Unfavorable - 8%

CASINO

LABOR PER
EMPLOYEE
Unfavorable -5 %
REVENUE PER
EMPLOYEE
Unfavorable -1 %

PROPERTY
Headcount was
reduced by +11% but
an increase in average
salarry and wage
could not be offset by
a reduction in average
benefits and payroll
taxes. Overall
efficiency as
measured by revenue
per employee
decreased, too.
NET VARIANCE +7%
not keeping pace with
-13% decrease in Total
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Figure 8

2011 VERSUS 2007 VARIANCE

BY OPERATING DEPARTMENT AND GENERAL & ADMINSITRATIVE
$500,000,000

$0
CASINO

HOTEL

GAMING TAXES

LABOR

FOOD

BEVERAGE

OTHER

GEN. & ADMIN.

EBITDA

($500,000,000)

($1,000,000,000)

($1,500,000,000)

($2,000,000,000)
REVENUE

Figure 9

MARKETING

COST OF SALES

VARIANCE
EBITDA Var.
% Change
Depr. & Amort.
% Change
EBIT Variance
% Change
Interest
% Change
PT NI Variance
% Change

($1,484,931,759)
-40%
($515,292,844)
-48%
($2,000,224,603)
-76%
($1,144,305,839)
-101%
($3,144,530,442)
-208%

OTHER

REVENUE
($1,748,911,667)
-12%

($1,748,911,667)
-12%

($1,748,911,667)
-12%

TOTAL EXPENSES

EXPENSES
$263,979,908
2%
($515,292,844)
-48%
($251,312,936)
-2%
($1,144,305,839)
-101%
($1,395,618,775)
-11%

PROFIT
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Notes
1
2

3

4

All time periods will be Fiscal Years ending June 30 to align with the 12 month calendar used by
Nevada regulators to report industry results unless otherwise noted.

All data from this article is from the Nevada State Gaming Control Board’s Nevada Gaming
Abstract, the official statistical report of the Nevada regulators unless otherwise indicated. There
are two reporting categories for the Las Vegas Strip: properties that report 12 month annual
gaming revenue between $1 million and $72 million and those that generate $72 million and
above. While not the subject of this article, in 2007 there were 15 properties in the $1 million to
$72 million category that generated $150M in Pre-tax Net Income or 9 percent of the total 38
property Las Vegas Strip Pre-tax Net Income of $ +1.7B. This article will focus on the top
performing property category because they so dominate the financial performance of Las Vegas
Strip properties, i.e., 23 properties generated 91 percent of total reported Las Vegas Strip Pre-tax
Net Income in 2007 and 22 properties generated 74 percent of the Pre-tax Net Loss in 2011.

The 256 statewide casinos Pre-tax Net Loss for 2011 was $ - 4.0 billion generating a fair amount
of commentary because it was worse than the statewide 2010 Pre-tax Net Loss of $ -3.4 billion.
The 148 Clark County casinos which include Las Vegas casinos generated $-4.0 billion in Pre-tax
net Loss or 100 percent of the State total with the remaining categories (other Nevada counties)
reporting mixed income and losses but the total net impact was not sufficient to change the
overall State performance. Within Clark County, the 41 Las Vegas Strip properties generated a
loss of $ -2.2 billion or 55 percent of the total loss. The remaining $ -1.8 million loss was
generated by the 107 other casinos in Clark County. Of this amount a $ -1.3 billion loss was
reported by the “Balance of County” category the performance of which is dominated by large,
publicly held locals’ casinos.

The Dow Jones Industrial Average peaked in July 2007 at 13,896 and hit a low in January 2009 of
7,609.
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